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Abstract. Neutral framing is a standard tool of experimental
economics. However, overly neutral instructions, which lack any
contextual clues, can lead to strange behavior. In a contextless
second price auction for a meaningless good, a majority of sub-
jects enter positive bids—a case of cognitive experimenter demand
effect. Subjects bid positive amounts because this is what they
think they are tasked with in the experiment. Adding a second
auction that has a context drastically reduces the positive bids
in the meaningless first auction by reducing the cognitive experi-
menter demand effect.
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1. Introduction
Experiments in economics typically present their instructions in a
neutral frame, without context. More complicated experiments may
use a small amount of framing to further the understanding of the
mechanisms used in the experiment, but even these experiments avoid
the inclusion of any contextual clues that could suggest ‘correct’ be-
havior.1 However, there is a drawback to overly neutral framing.
We report an experiment which shows that context helps subjects to
find the meaning of the task described in the instructions. Specifically,
in the absense of any context, a majority of subjects in our experiment
enter positive bids in an auction for a meaningless activity, despite
having been checked on their understanding of the mechanism of the
auction. If the experiment is conducted with more context, connected
to a new, second, auction where a potentially reasonable activity is sold,
the bids in the meaningless auction drastically decline. A possible ex-
planation is that context helps to reduce an experimenter demand effect
(EDE) which is present in the auction without context. Once subjects
can identify some sensible task in the experiment (e.g. figuring out the
value of the good in the second auction and bidding accordingly), they
are less likely to take an action in a non-sensible task simply because
that action is available.
Experimental economists use the term “experimenter demand effect”
to describe the fact that the experimenter might influence the subjects’
decision in the experiment.2 This can lead to the experimenter’s con-
cluding that the tested hypothesis is true, even though the effect is
solely due to the experimenter’s demand. Zizzo (2010) distinguishes
the EDE into social EDE and cognitive EDE. In social EDE, the sub-
jects act as the experimenters (explicitly) ask them to. A famous ex-
ample is the experiment by Milgram (1963), where subjects were asked
to administer electrical shocks. In contrast, in cognitive EDE, subjects
do not react to a direct demand. Instead, they react to a perceived
implicit demand. As participants in an experiment, the subjects “try
to make sense of the unfamiliar and incompletely defined experimen-
tal environment” (Zizzo, 2010). That is, the subjects try to figure out
1See Davis and Holt (1993); Friedman and Sunder (1994). A discussion of neutral
framing is given in Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006).
2Experimental psychologists have long studied the same topic under the name
of the “Hawthorne effect” (Adair, 1984).
2 BIDDING FOR NOTHING?
what they are supposed to do. Our finding is an example of cognitive
EDE, since the subjects are not explicitly asked to bid, but from the
lack of context, construe that they are being asked to bid.
2. The Experiment
The experiment consists of two treatments: one auction (1A) and
two auctions (2A). At the heart of each treatment is a second price
auction. In this second price auction, we auction off the right to “de-
stroy” a paper envelope.3 The subjects were anonymously matched into
bidding groups of three. The highest bidder won the right to destroy
the envelope and had to pay the second highest bid. In the case of tied
highest bids, one bidder was randomly selected as the winner. The
allowed range of bids was 0 . . . 10 euro, with a stepsize of 0.01. Pay-
ment for the bid was not out of pocket, but implemented via previous
earnings in the experiment.4
Before the auction took place, the subjects had to answer some test
questions that checked whether they understood that the winner would
only have to pay the second highest bid, that there would always be a
winner of the auction, and that it was possible to ensure a cost of zero
by bidding zero.5
In treatment 1A, the subjects bid in one auction, auction NC. The
auctioned good is the right to destroy one envelope. The subjects
received no background information about the envelope, nor were they
given any reason why the envelope should or should not be destroyed.
In treatment 2A, the subjects bid in two auctions: auction NC and
auction C. Auction NC was identical to the auction in treatment 1A
described above. In contrast to the context-free auction NC, auction
C was embedded in a larger context within treatment 2A. In 2A, all
subjects were matched with an additional non-bidding subject. At the
start of 2A, all bidding subjects had to perform a tedious real effort
3The act of destroying was not further specified. Most subjects opted for either
crossing out the envelope with pens, or ripping the envelope into pieces.
4In the case of 2A, the previous earnings consisted of a show-up fee and the
money gained in a real effort task. In the case of 1A, a separate, unconnected
experiment was run beforehand and the subjects could use their earnings from this
experiment to bid. In both cases, the average earnings were similar.
5A full description of the instructions and test questions can be found in the on-
line appendix: http://www.uni-heidelberg.de/md/awi/professuren/with2/Duersch
-Mueller-BfN-appendix.zip and in Duersch and Mu¨ller (2013).
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task. Afterwards, the non-bidding subjects had the choice to allocate
the earnings from that task either fully to the bidding subjects, who
worked, or to take 80% of the earnings for themselves and leave the
bidding subjects with just 20%.
The envelope, which could be destroyed when winning auction C, is
no longer without context, but connected to this allocation decision.
To be precise, it contained the 80% of earnings which the non-bidding
subject allocated to themself. Thus, the real effort task and allocation
decision form a strong context for the bidding.6,7
The bids in treatment 2A were elicited via the strategy method.
The subjects gave bids for both auctions. Afterwards, one auction was
randomly selected to come into effect. Only the winner of the selected
auction got to destroy an envelope and had to pay the second highest
bid of that auction.
The experiment was conducted in the laboratory of the University
of Heidelberg and the laboratory of SFB 504 in Mannheim. In all,
33 subjects participated in treatment 1A (in three sessions); 40 sub-
jects participated in treatment 2A (in two sessions). Out of these, 30
6Destroying the envelope was not equivalent to reducing the allocator’s payoff.
Instead, in a separate stage before the auction, the bidding subjects decided whether
or not to reduce the allocator’s payoff by exactly the amount present in one envelope
(a few allocators decided to leave all earnings with the working subjects, we drop
those observations from the analysis). This reduction happened regardless of the
outcome of the auction. Thus, while the real effort task and the allocation decision
form a strong context of bidding, the bidding was not equivalent to punishing.
There was no payoff change for any other person when winning the auctions. Of
course the winner would still pay the second highest bid. To test whether filling
the envelope with paper money instead of leaving it empty changed the bids, we
ran one-half of NC with empty envelopes (as in NC in treatment 2A) and the
other half with envelopes filled with paper money (as in C in treatment 2A). There
was no significant difference in bids (two-sided MWU test, p = 0.428, obs.=33),
therefore we pool the data.
7Using a real effort task and an allocation decision to provide a context for the
bidding in auction C of treatment 2A might not seem very intuitive. In fact, this
is due to our reusing the data from an experiment with a very different research
question: whether subjects are willing to bid to personally punish (Duersch and
Mu¨ller, 2013). However, auction C is not the main interest here. We want to
compare the auction without context, NC, in two situations: one standing alone,
and one while being contrasted with an auction with some form of strong context.
The exact nature of that context is not important.
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subjects were bidders in the auctions and 10 subjects allocators. All
recruitment used ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
3. Results
Table 1 shows the average bids in the auctions. When the auc-
tion without context, NC, was conducted on its own in treatment one
auction, 1A, a majority of subjects (52%) made positive bids. How-
ever, when auction NC was set in contrast with an auction with con-
text (auction C) in treatment two auctions, 2A, far fewer subjects bid
(17%).
treat. auction obs. avg.(SD) max bid>0 bid=0
2A
C 30 0.335 (0.98) 4.00 63% 37%
NC 30 0.03 (0.10) 0.50 17% 83%
1A NC 33 0.67 (1.78) 6.50 52% 48%
Table 1. Bids (in Euro)
The bids in auction NC were significantly different across treatments
(two-sided MWU, p = 0.007, obs.=63). Even more, the bids in auction
NC in treatment 1A were so high that they were not significantly
different from the bids in auction C in treatment 2A (two-sided MWU,
p = 0.431, obs.=63). This is despite the fact that the bids within the
two auctions of treatment 2A (auction NC and C) were significantly
different (Wilcoxon signed rank test, two-sided, p = 0.015, obs.=30).
4. Discussion
Does our treatment 1A imply that people have a willingness to pay
up to e6.50 for the right to destroy an envelope? We think not.8 It
is much more likely that the overly neutral framing in 1A leads, via
a complete lack of context that could rationalize not bidding, to a
cognitive experimenter demand effect of being implicitly asked to bid.
As evidence of this, bidding in the contextless auction is much lower
when a different auction with some context is present, so that subjects
8The average bid of e0.03 in auction NC of treatment 2A might be an indication
of the real value subjects place on destroying an envelope.
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can rationalize the aim of the experiment as being about that other
context instead of the contextless destruction of an envelope.9
There is some anecdotal evidence for the cognitive experimenter de-
mand effect as well. While being handed her payment in treatment
1A, one subject mentioned that she “wanted to help” the nice experi-
menters (she entered one of the highest bids in the treatment). Appar-
ently, she must have felt that in a task where only bidding is possible,
and no context provides a hint whether bidding is “good” or “bad,”
high bids must be what the experimenters are looking for. No subject
in treatment 2A ever made an analogous statement.
Lei, Noussair, and Plott (2001) use a similar design, where the results
of a task are evaluated before and after adding a second task. However,
while they find some differences after adding the second task, their
main variable of interest (average price in an asset market) remains
unchanged. One important difference between their design and ours
is the amount of context of the second, added, task. In our case,
the second task provides more context, and the bids in the first task
decline. In their design, the context of both tasks is similar, suggesting
that adding tasks only reduces cognitive EDE if the added tasks allow
an easier construal of the task because of the presence of more of a
context.
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